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Offending White Men: Racial Vilification,  
Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice 
Louise Richardson-Self 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are 
increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white 
people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in 
fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can 
both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful 
hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that 
the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants 
misrecognize themselves in their own privileged racial specificity, and they 
misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. Such misrecognition 
preserves the cultural imperialism of Australia’s dominant social imaginary—a 
means of oppression that perpetuates epistemic insensitivity. Bringing this dual 
misrecognition to light best captures the indignity that is suffered by the victims of 
the aforementioned epistemic injustices. I argue that it is only when we truly 
recognize difference in its own terms, shifting the dominant social imaginary, that 
“mainstream Australians” can do their part in bringing about a just society. 
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Normative reflection must begin from historically specific circumstances because there 
is nothing but what is, the given, the situated interest in justice, from which to start. 
—Iris Marion Young 
 
It is crucial for any emancipatory movement to understand the hegemonic centre and 
the ways people situated there think and act. After all, it is from this powerful position 
that most political decisions affecting the largest number of people in society come. 
—Marcel Stoetzler and Nira Yuval-Davis 
 
 
 
 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, Article 4 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  2 
I. Introduction 
In Australia, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) (hereafter RDA), makes 
it a civil offence to engage in hate speech.1 The language of this legislation is 
ostensibly neutral (Gelber 2014, 407), and Part IIA permits a person of any race, 
colour, or national or ethnic origin to lodge a complaint with the Australian Human 
Rights Commission (AHRC) if they are the victim of an act which is reasonably likely, 
in all the circumstances, to offend, insult, humiliate, or intimidate them, and the act 
is done because of their race (section 18C). That said, the Australian courts have 
maintained that the conduct complained of must have profound and serious effects 
which are not equivalent to mere slights (AHRC 2016).2 Increasingly, white 
Australians are taking advantage of the ostensibly neutral language of the RDA to 
complain of racial vilification. Reports have the number of complaints at around 15 
percent for 2015–2016 (Shanahan 2017).3 At least some of these complaints are 
                                                          
1 Specifically, it prohibits “race hatred,” and according to the Australian Human 
Rights Commission, examples of race hatred may include racially offensive material 
on the internet, racially offensive comments or images in a publication, racially 
offensive speeches or abusive comments in a public place, and the like (AHRC 2015). 
For ease, I refer to this sort of behaviour collectively as “hate speech” and use this 
term synonymously with vilification. 
2 Section 18C is also balanced by section 18D, which does not render unlawful 
anything said or done “reasonably and in good faith” in a number of circumstances, 
including “a fair comment on any event or matter of public interest if the comment 
is an expression of a genuine belief held by the person making the comment.” 
3 One high profile case saw Senator David Leyonhjelm complain to the AHRC of 
being called an “angry white male” in an article written by journalist Mark Kenny 
(Henderson and Patel 2016). However, this complaint was ultimately terminated by 
the AHRC on the ground that he was not truly aggrieved (Koziol 2016). (Senator Eric 
Abetz also voiced the opinion that Kenny’s remark was racist, see Hutchens and Karp 
2016.) The AHRC have, however, accepted complaints of white vilification in the 
past. For example, in 2003 Neal McLeod complained to the AHRC of being called a 
“white piece of shit,” among other things, by Samantha Power, an Indigenous 
woman. This complaint was unable to be conciliated so the matter was taken by 
McLeod to a Federal court for determination; however, the case was ultimately 
unsuccessful (Gelber 2014, 405–406). 
White Australians’ are also complaining of racial vilification to other bodies. 
Cases of white vilification have been brought under State law. For instance, in 
Western Australia, 2006, a 16-year-old Aboriginal girl was charged with engaging in 
conduct intended to racially harass, which took place during an assault. (The 
Western Australian criminal code makes incitement to racial hatred an offence.) The 
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intended, in part, to illustrate that the RDA sets the bar too low for what constitutes 
hate speech and that legislative reform is an urgent necessity. This has recently 
been a topic of fierce public debate, sparking a Parliamentary Inquiry into Freedom 
of Speech in Australia in 2016, and many Australians continue to believe that the 
RDA should be amended.4 
However, white vilification claims are typically (but not always) dismissed, 
since the speech complained of is considered to constitute only a mere slight. From 
a certain perspective, this is reverse racism (Moran 2009, 798). Many Australians 
are wary of differential treatment for people on the basis of race (Moran 2009, 
791). The “natural” conclusion is, therefore, that a double standard is applied by the 
AHRC when they investigate claims of racial vilification and that white Australians 
are less protected than everyone else. This undermines equality, which the law is 
meant to ensure, and which Australians supposedly value as a community (Moran 
2009, 798). Such perceptions of bias also appear to have been a contributing factor 
in establishing the aforementioned Inquiry. As Senator Ian Goodenough, chair of the 
Inquiry, explained:  
 
Anecdotally, there is a perception that certain ethnic minorities are afforded 
greater protections from constructive criticism than mainstream Australians 
                                                          
victim in this case had been called a “white slut.” However, while the girl pleaded 
guilty to assault, “the Kalgoorlie Children’s Court dismissed the racial charges saying 
that the racial vilification laws ‘were intended to deal with severe abuse, and not 
petty name-calling’” (Mason 2009, 332). Additionally, several complaints were also 
recently lodged with the Advertising Standards Bureau regarding a television 
advertisement for lamb which attempted to humorously address the lack of 
diversity in Australian broadcasting. Complaints included: “I object to the slander 
that infers that white men contribute towards a ‘lack of diversity’ which was 
completely offensive to my family, particularly my father, brother, husband and son! 
Is it ‘diverse’ to completely remove one in favour of another?” and “The person 
points out that they are white and male saying that this adds to a lack of diversity. 
Pointing out someone’s race and gender in an advertisement and then denigrating 
such race or gender is both racist and sexist.” However, all complaints were 
dismissed (Thomsen 2016). 
4 The results of the Inquiry were released in February 2017, and subsequently a bill 
was introduced which sought to amend the wording of section 18C of the RDA 
(Human Rights Legislation Amendment Bill 2017). It proposed to omit the terms 
“offend, insult, humiliate,” and replace them with “harass.” However, this was 
dropped by the third reading of the bill, and ultimately no changes to the RDA were 
made. 
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through political correctness. Rightly or wrongly, this perception does exist, 
and I would like to see the playing field levelled. (quoted in Gaynor 2017; 
emphasis added) 
 
Though Senator Goodenough is a Singaporean immigrant himself, his comment 
betrays an implicit but widespread recognition of which people count as 
“mainstream Australians”—mainstream Australians are those who do not belong to 
certain ethnic minority groups; that is, mainstream Australians are white 
Australians. 
In this article, I argue that white vilification complainants are not victims of a 
double standard. Instead, I show that this conclusion is generated from a 
misrecognition of self and other. Further, with reference to a contemporary case 
study, I argue that white vilification complaints can both constitute and cause 
epistemic injustices, and that it is the aforementioned misrecognition which 
grounds these injustices. That is to say, if not for this misrecognition, these 
injustices would not occur. To advance this argument, this article takes the following 
structure. In section 2, I offer some contextualization and outline the details of two 
complaints lodged with the AHRC against Linda Burney, MP, the first Indigenous 
woman elected to the House of Representatives. In section 3, I discuss the contours 
of Australia’s dominant social imaginary and show how this liberal imaginary 
encourages a form of misrecognition necessary for producing the rationale 
supporting white vilification complaints. In section 4, I critique this misrecognition 
from the perspective of a resistant imaginary which advances a politics of 
difference. In section 5, I illustrate that the complaints in question constitute the 
epistemic injustice of willful hermeneutical ignorance, as theorized by Gaile 
Pohlhaus, Jr. (2012, following Mills 1997). In section 6, I illustrate how the 
complaints in question can cause comparative credibility excess, as theorized by 
José Medina (2011). In concluding, I reiterate that white vilification complainants 
reduce differences to unity—to the singular logic of the universal human Subject 
(Young 1990, 97). Paying attention to this failure of recognition best captures the 
indignity that is suffered by the victims of epistemic injustices (Congdon 2017, 246). 
I will argue that it is only when we truly recognize difference in its own terms—as 
alterity—that “mainstream Australians” can do their part in bringing about a just 
society. 
 
II. White Vilification Complaints in Australia: A Case Study 
In 2016, 44 complaints were lodged in response to a public statement by 
Linda Burney, MP, following the Federal Government’s announcement of the 
aforementioned inquiry into freedom of speech (Zanetti 2017). She remarked, “It 
astounds me that the people that are advocating for the removal of 18C are 
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basically white men of a certain age that have never experienced racial 
discrimination in their life” (quoted in Zanetti 2016a). Two of these complainants 
were Bernard Gaynor, a failed Senate candidate, and political cartoonist Paul 
Zanetti.5 Of Burney’s comment, Zanetti states, “I was shocked, stunned, hurt and 
offended to see and hear a publicly elected representative resorting to such a 
blatantly sexist, racist and ageist argument” (2016a). Gaynor writes that Burney’s 
words “are clearly racist and they make offensive and insulting connotations about 
white men,” noting that he expects the AHRC to “take [his complaint] seriously” 
(2016). As it so happens, both Gaynor and Zanetti are in favour of reforms to section 
18C of the RDA. What they object to is the assertion that they endorse legislative 
reform because of their whiteness and maleness. From their perspective, any 
reasonable person should be able to see that this is a bad law. (Zanetti, in particular, 
notes that not every person in favour of legal reform is white, and that Burney knew 
this before making her statement; see 2016b.)  
These complaints are designed to make a broader political point. Gaynor, for 
example, thinks racial vilification ought not to be legally prohibited, no matter who 
is targeted. He states: 
 
I hope [my complaint against Burney] fails. . . . But it must fail for the right 
reason. It should fail because Linda Burney should be free in our democratic 
nation to make such statements, regardless of the offence they cause. . . . In 
other words, the complaint should not fail because it is deemed trivial but 
because 18C itself is an unlawful law that infringes upon the implied 
constitutional protection of freedom of political communication. (Gaynor 
2016) 
 
So, while Gaynor appears to believe that Burney’s comment is racist, he nonetheless 
thinks that this degree of racism ought to be legally permissible and socially 
tolerated irrespective of the target. 
                                                          
5 I have chosen to analyse these complainants because Gaynor and Zanetti have 
published their views on their respective blogs. (Details of the complaints of racial 
vilification made to the AHRC are not otherwise available to the public.) There is 
nothing unique about Gaynor and Zanetti’s complaints; rather, they are 
representative examples of reasoning patterns shared by many “mainstream 
Australians.” 
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Zanetti makes the point that it is no more trivial to complain of white 
vilification than it is to complain of (for example) indigenous vilification.6 Consider 
Zanetti’s attempt to show equivalence of harm: he says, “Ms Burney has used her 
position, not to debate the issue, but to intimidate a group based on skin colour, 
causing humiliation and offence” (2016c; emphasis added). He also writes that “race 
hate laws as they stand must be applied to all, not only some, regardless of skin 
colour” (Zanetti 2016c). While the law may be written in language that is ostensibly 
neutral, from the perspective of “mainstream Australians” like Zanetti, it seems that 
all-but white people are being protected from “constructive criticism.” Adding to 
the perception of a double-standard, in this case, is the fact that all complaints 
against Burney were terminated (Zanetti 2017). Zanetti thus complains: “The 
message I got from the commission . . . is their obligation [to accept and conciliate 
complaints] does not apply to “white men.” We have no rights, or at the very best, 
lesser rights than non-white men or any coloured women” (2016c). He also 
recommends, “Before filing a complaint with the AHRC, always identify as an 
aboriginal woman” (Zanetti 2017).7  
In the remainder of this article, I will argue that, though “white vilification” is 
no more than a mere slight within the Australian context, we ought to be concerned 
when white vilification complaints like these are aired in the public sphere.8 This is 
because such complaints both constitute and cause epistemic injustices, and the 
misrecognition that belies them perpetuates the cultural imperialism of Australia’s 
dominant social imaginary.  
 
III. White Vilification in Australia’s Dominant Social Imaginary 
Australia’s dominant social imaginary is a liberal imaginary, and the 
dominant social imaginary is what frames the dominant epistemic context of a 
community. Lennon describes social imaginaries as latent within our public worlds 
(Lennon 2015, 112); they are taken-for-granted repertories which we use to make 
sense of our own and others’ situation(s) (Taylor 2004, 25). But imaginaries are also 
much more than this. They provide our affective way of experiencing the world and 
the others we encounter within it, both as individuals and as members of groups 
                                                          
6 Zanetti considers his complaint to be equivalent to an accepted complaint lodged 
against political cartoonist Bill Leak following the publication of a cartoon which 
depicted racist stereotypes about Indigenous Australians (see 2016b). 
7 It is worth noting that the complainant in the Bill Leak case was an Indigenous 
woman. 
8 Although I cannot be certain without further investigation, I suspect that the 
conclusions drawn here can be extended to complaints of white vilification in other 
western liberal democracies, too.  
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(Lennon 2015, 112). Now, what it takes for a society to be just, from Australia’s 
liberal perspective, is for society not to be stratified by unfair relations of 
domination and oppression. This is “driven by conceptions of individual 
responsibility, equality, and reciprocity” (Moran 2009, 789).  
Of course, Australians are aware that their society was not a just society in 
the past. Australia was a settler colony, and the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 
(Cth)—the cornerstone of the White Australia Policy—was the very first act to pass 
the first federal parliament (Edmonds and Carey 2016, 381–382). This society 
cannot reasonably deny its past relations of racial domination and oppression. But 
“mainstream Australians” can—and often do—deny the relevance of the past on 
the present (Moran 2009, 798). Indeed, many believe that the aim of bringing about 
a just society has been more or less achieved today. Consider some statements by 
former Australian Senators which are representative of this attitude: “Australians 
are generally decent and tolerant;” “Australia is blessed with less racism than 
virtually any other country on earth;” “Australia has a long and successful history of 
multiculturalism;” and “I . . . believe that Australia is free of a good many evils . . . 
such as political and religious intolerance and widespread racism.”9  
We may say, then, that many mainstream Australians incorporate the 
following meaning-generating narrative into their sense of identity—a story that 
explains fundamentally who Australians are, what it is that they value, where 
Australians have been, and how far Australians have come: 
 
There was once a time of caste and class, when tradition decreed that each 
group had its place, and that some were born to rule and others to serve. In 
this time of darkness, law and social norms defined rights, privileges, and 
obligations differently for different groups. . . . Then one day Enlightenment 
dawned, heralding a revolutionary conception of humanity and society. All 
people are equal, the revolutionaries declared, inasmuch as all have a 
capacity for reason and moral sense. . . . For over two hundred years since 
those voices of Reason first rang out, the forces of light have struggled for 
liberty and political equality against the dark forces of irrational prejudice, 
arbitrary metaphysics, and the crumbling towers of patriarchal church, state, 
and family. . . . Today in our society very few vestiges of prejudice and 
discrimination remain, but we are working on them, and have nearly realized 
                                                          
9 These statements were made by Australian Federal Senators Siegfried Spindler, 
James Short, Belinda Neal, and Christopher Ellison, respectively, speaking both for 
and against the Racial Hatred Bill 1994 (Cth) during its second reading in the Senate. 
The passage of this bill is what introduced anti-hate speech legislation into Federal 
law (Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 23 August 1995, 210–244). 
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the dream those Enlightenment fathers dared to propound. (Young 1990, 
156–157) 
 
This is a narrative that mainstream Australians share with other heirs to the 
Enlightenment tradition. Adopted in the Australian context, this particular meaning-
generating narrative acknowledges the flaws of our colonial past yet celebrates the 
achievements of the present. In short, Australia’s dominant social imaginary 
presents as Truth the impression that due to our fundamental commitment to 
equality, all people can now have a “fair go,” reasonably unencumbered by 
prejudicial attitudes, actions, laws, and policies.10 In other words, many Australians 
find the idea that Australia is a racist country “incomprehensible and against the 
grain of common sense” (Moran 2009, 798). And, importantly, this “makes people’s 
antennae alert to any signs of differential treatment” (Moran 2009, 798).11 
Of course, there is still some disagreement as to just how far along the path 
of Enlightenment Australia has really travelled. That is, there is debate as to 
whether Australia is more or less equal. (A recent survey found that 39 percent of 
Australians think Australia is a racist country, but that number rose to 57 percent 
when answered specifically by Indigenous Australians; see Wood 2017.) Yet many 
seem to agree on the ideal we are working toward: a society that is beyond race.12 
The basic idea is this: given our commitment to equality for all, we should not give 
people “special rights” on the basis of their differences, for our differences are 
ultimately arbitrary—to treat someone differently due to their skin colour is as 
peculiar as treating someone differently due to their eye colour.13 A just society, we 
                                                          
10 The rhetoric of a “fair go” is a staple in Australian public discourse; see, e.g., 
Haggis and Schech (2009) and Moran (2009). 
11 If anything, mainstream Australians are becoming suspicious that the scales have 
now tipped too far in the other direction, that white people are now so vilified as to 
have become marginalized. It is worth noting that the problem of “hate speech 
against whites” has recently arisen the Australian Senate. Consider One Nation 
leader Senator Pauline Hanson’s motion proposing that the Senate acknowledge 
“the deplorable rise of anti-white racism and attacks on Western civilisation” and 
that “it is okay to be white” (Bourke 2018). This motion was defeated, but only 
narrowly, with a total of 31 votes against and 28 votes in favour. However, after the 
motion made headlines, Finance Minister Mathias Cormann claimed that the 
Coalition’s support was a mistake and due to an administrative error (Morgan and 
Elton-Pym, 2018). 
12 Anderson (2017) calls this post-racialism. 
13 On the problem of articulating equivalent rights as “special rights,” see 
Richardson-Self (2015, 64–66, 117–120). 
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seem to think, is one which is impartial to the various forms of embodied human 
difference that we encounter. The only thing that matters, really, is our equal 
human status and a fair go. Thus, in the Australian dominant social imaginary, what 
would constitute a just society is not in question. What we need to do is cast aside 
our differences, not allow them to cloud our judgment, and ultimately take them to 
be irrelevant. Call this the ideal of impartiality (Young 1990, 10). 
By paying attention to the foundational role of the Enlightenment narrative 
in Australia’s dominant social imaginary, including the ideal of impartiality, it is 
possible to see why white people are genuinely able to understand themselves as 
victims of racist hate speech, even as they simultaneously argue that such speech 
should not be legally actionable (because, to them, racism isn’t really that bad all 
things considered—free speech is of far greater importance). The arguments of 
Zanetti and Gaynor are two-pronged: like cases should be treated alike, yet the 
standard for prohibiting racist hate speech is too low. If it is okay to say, “He just 
thinks like that because he’s white,” then what is wrong with saying, “He just thinks 
like that because he’s black”? Parity of reasoning demands we treat such cases as 
equivalent, and the fact that no one would seriously consider punishing someone 
for a comment like Burney’s should illustrate that legal reform is urgently 
necessary—otherwise, white people will continue to be the victims of reverse 
racism and “free speech” will not be adequately protected. 
This is presented as a rational, calm, considered normative position. By using 
this strategy—that is, by trading on the ideal of impartiality and the grounding 
liberal narrative—“the standpoint of the privileged, their particular experience and 
standards, is [again] constructed as normal and neutral” (Young 1990, 116). Theirs is 
constructed as the perspective of “ordinary,” or mainstream, Australians (Moran 
2009, 797). Thus, the complainants hold “the false assumption that a particular 
standpoint [is] neither particular, nor a standpoint,” which obscures the link 
between (cultural) power and knowledge (Tuana 2017, 127). So, the fact that the 
complainants, as white Australians, inevitably think, imagine, and reason from a 
partial and socially powerful perspective is rendered invisible to them (and 
sometimes to others, that is, to some nonwhite Australians). But problematically, as 
Young identifies, “by claiming to provide a standpoint which all subjects can adopt, 
[one] denies difference between subjects” (1990, 10). White vilification 
complainants speak from what they presume is an impartial perspective, which 
denies the genuine alterity of others and denies that they may have (greater) 
knowledge to offer. 
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IV. Resistant Imaginings and (Re-)Cognizing Difference 
Critics of the liberal tradition are not convinced by the above meaning-
generating narrative, nor do they ascribe to impartiality as an ideal of political 
engagement. The main quarrel, as Young explains,  
 
is with the story’s conclusion, namely, that since we have achieved formal 
equality, only vestiges and holdovers of differential privilege remain, which 
will die out with the continued persistent assertion of an ideal of social 
relations that make differences irrelevant to a person’s life prospects. (Young 
1990, 163–164) 
 
In short, advocating for the ideal of impartiality covers over an uncomfortable truth: 
differences are not and cannot be irrelevant to a person’s life prospects. This has 
been obscured, Luce Irigaray explains, by the fact that “for centuries, no-one 
imagined that different subjects might exist” (2000, 121). Subsequently, to be 
human was imagined according to a logic of singularity: one generic, universal 
human type.  
“Of course,” Irigaray continues, “from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
attention turned increasingly to the question of the other,” but:  
 
Others were nothing but copies of the idea of man, a potentially perfect idea 
which all the more or less imperfect copies had to try to equal. These copies, 
moreover, were not defined in their own terms, in other words, according to 
a different subjectivity, but in those of an ideal subjectivity and as a function 
of their deficiencies with respect to it: age, race, culture, sex, etc. The model 
of the subject thus remained singular, and the “others” represented more or 
less good examples within the hierarchy established in relation to the 
singular subject. (Irigaray 2000, 122) 
 
Several feminist scholars and critical race theorists have challenged the supposed 
neutrality of the liberal Subject (e.g., Anderson 2017; Lloyd 1984; Mills 1997; Okin 
1979, 1989; Pateman 1988). Young claims that the universal citizen is, in fact, 
“disembodied, dispassionate (male) reason. The universal citizen is also white and 
bourgeois” (Young 1990, 110). Elsewhere I have argued argues that this Subject is 
really “the male, masculine, rational, heterosexual, adult, white, 
Western/Eurocentric, able-bodied public actor,” or “benchmark man,” for short 
(Richardson-Self 2015, 57). That is to say, the liberal Subject is a partial subject. 
Further, summarizing Mills, Pohlhaus explains that “white European men are 
regarded as ‘generic’ prototypical knowers collectively on a progressive path toward 
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knowing the world” (2017, 17). That is, this Subject is also presented as the 
universal, impartial bearer of Truth.14 
The claim is not only that the perspective of the universal Subject has, as a 
matter of fact, been the perspective of a highly partial subject. The claim is also that 
Others cannot simply be recognized by traditional political theory because there is 
no singular human generic, no one standpoint which all subjects can adopt, despite 
the impression yielded by traditional epistemology (Bubeck 2000; Pohlhaus 2012; 
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002; Young 1990). From these critiques emerges a 
“politics of difference”—the push for a society which does not strive for an 
impartiality that can never be achieved, but instead asserts that “there is equality 
among socially and culturally differentiated groups who mutually respect one 
another and affirm one another in their differences” (Young 1990, 163; see also 
Anderson 2017; Bubeck 2000). The aim is to move away from understanding human 
difference as “more” or “less” with reference to an implicit but highly partial norm, 
away from a singular understanding of humanity, and instead to move toward 
recognition of and respect for alterity (Bubeck 2000, 196). This critique does not see 
“difference” as deviance, devaluation, or hierarchical opposition, which matters 
greatly if we are to undermine the cultural imperialism of the dominant social 
imaginary and so reduce oppression (Young 1990, 171). 
Difference, according to this resistant imagining, has a specific, emancipatory 
meaning. It now comes to mean specificity, variation, and heterogeneity: 
“Difference names relations of similarity and dissimilarity that can be reduced to 
neither coextensive identity nor nonoverlapping otherness” (Young 1990, 171). 
Consequently, in terms of what actual social groups may require to ensure social 
equality, we find that in some cases, people “may need to be unburdened of 
excessive ascribed or constructed distinctiveness,” (that is, of “Otherness” 
understood as inferiority) whilst in other cases, people may need “to have hitherto 
underacknowledged distinctiveness taken into account” (Fraser 2000, 115), that is, 
for alterity to be recognized . These are two sides of the same coin. We may 
therefore consider the politics of difference as constituting a resistant, marginal 
imaginary which runs counter to the liberal tradition, which disavows the ideal of 
impartiality, and understands “equality” as “equal regard”—a form of recognition 
that involves the esteem of multiple identities (Richardson-Self 2015, 3; Congdon 
2017, 248). 
From this perspective, we are now equipped to see that our white vilification 
complainants (and perhaps a great many mainstream Australians) do not 
                                                          
14 And importantly, the liberal tradition considers itself “to be the only legitimate 
tradition of thought able to produce knowledge and the only one with access to 
‘universality,’ ‘rationality,’ and ‘truth’” (Grosfoguel, quoted in Tuana 2017, 131). 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, Article 4 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  12 
understand that their racial specificity is qualitatively distinct from other forms of 
raced identity, nor that this impacts what they know about the world. So, while they 
endorse a narrow norm of equal recognition that “recognizes only those qualities 
that are taken to be universally shared” (Markell 2006, 452; emphasis added), they 
mistake their experience of “being raced” as a qualitatively universal experience. In 
addition, they mistake their conclusions regarding hate speech laws as impartial, 
disembodied, rational, and unbiased because of this. These white vilification 
complainants hold onto the ideal of impartiality and the individualistic, liberal 
humanist dream of “equality” through a denial of the relevance of racial difference. 
Thus, ultimately, they misrecognize race, and what is going on here is a two-fold 
misrecognition: they misrecognize themselves in their own privileged racial 
specificity, and they misrecognize others in their own marginal racial specificity. The 
“natural” conclusion is that we can therefore reason about Australia’s true values 
and the makeup of a just society from an impartial, egalitarian perspective. But 
situatedness, feelings, perspectives, desires, and commitments “do not cease to 
exist and motivate just because they have been excluded [in theory]. . . . They lurk 
as inarticulate shadows, belying the claim to comprehensiveness of universalist 
reason” (Young 1990, 103). 
Why does this matter? In Young’s words, the ideal of impartiality “reinforces 
oppression by hypostatizing the point of view of privileged groups into a universal 
position,” and this “allows privileged groups to ignore their own group specificity” 
and (re-)assert cultural imperialism over various minorities (Young 1990, 112, 165). 
What Young calls cultural imperialism can be understood as the unjust imposition of 
a particular way of imagining the world—where the dominant group produces the 
dominant social imaginary, but this imaginary cannot effectively be challenged by 
others, is frequently adopted by those others (causing alienation), and is directly 
responsible for “‘Othering” those groups in the first place (Lennon 2015, 105). These 
are oppressive social imaginaries. This also matters because this type of 
misrecognition underscores at least two forms of epistemic injustice, as I detail 
below. Because the white vilification complainants’ cultural perspective is the 
dominant, hegemonic perspective masquerading as the universal, it is all too easy to 
deny the legitimacy of others’ knowledge and to harm them in their capacity as 
knowers. 
 
V. Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance 
My claim is that the white vilification complaints analysed here both cause 
and constitute particular forms of epistemic injustice. One such epistemic injustice 
is willful hermeneutical ignorance, a form of ignorance for which people are morally 
culpable. Here I am assuming that the complainants genuinely believe that white 
vilification and nonwhite vilification are qualitatively equivalent. For the purposes of 
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this article, I am interested in how misrecognition creates genuine yet false beliefs 
about social status, entitlements, and equality, and how this in turn brings about 
epistemic injustices without any ill will toward oppressed racial groups. 
Nonetheless, this is something that white vilification complainants could and should 
know, and for this reason they are accountable for their ignorance. In order to 
illustrate how one can be culpable for what they do not know, we must return to 
feminist standpoint theory. 
As epistemic agents, we are all situated—there is no generic “knower” 
unbound by social location. The situations in which we find ourselves as a 
consequence of our social positioning create “common challenges,” and these 
common challenges come to constitute part of the knower’s lived experience. This 
experience is shared by others who also occupy the relevant social location, but not 
by those otherwise located. When particular experiences—that is, particular 
common challenges—are repeated over time, “these challenges can lead to habits 
of expectation, attention, and concern, thereby contributing to what one is more or 
less likely to notice and pursue as an object of knowledge in the experienced world” 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 717). That is to say, the different material conditions of people’s 
lives (including the reception of the differences of our material bodies) affect what 
we are attuned to notice and what we are likely to see or experience. This in turn 
shapes how we make sense of our worlds—that is, it shapes what we know (see 
Pohlhaus 2012, 716–717).  
However, it is a misperception that certain knowledge acquisition is only 
possible given a particular form of situatedness according to standpoint theory. 
Many standpoint theorists have argued against this interpretation, suggesting that 
through dialogue between marginalized and dominant, oppressor and oppressed, 
we are better able to approximate more objective knowledge (e.g., Bubeck 2000; 
Pohlhaus 2012; Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis 2002). That is to say, standpoint theorists 
believe that we can train persons in different material conditions to be sensitive 
toward the experiences of the marginalized, that through cooperative dialogue and 
trust the marginalized can share their epistemic resources, and that the privileged 
can learn to utilize these epistemic resources in order to better make sense of their 
own and the marginalized’s experiences.  
To explicate this idea, it pays to look to Pohlhaus’s useful distinction 
between the “situatedness” and “interdependence” of knowers. All knowers are 
situated, but “relations with others are necessary for providing and maintaining 
[the] epistemic resources with which we know” (Pohlhaus 2012, 717). These 
epistemic resources—such as language, propositions, concepts, standards of 
judgment, and so forth—are always developed (and operate) interdependently. 
And, as Pohlhaus further explains, “Our epistemic lives are fundamentally 
intertwined with one another such that one cannot simply ignore other knowers 
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and know well” (2017, 16; original emphasis). Quite simply, it is because epistemic 
resources are shared, because these tools can be taken up and utilized even by 
persons who are not similarly socially situated, that we can collectively approximate 
a more accurate knowledge of our worlds. That is, so long as differently situated 
collectives “work cooperatively rather than coercively . . . it is not in principle 
impossible for those dominantly situated to recognize and learn to use epistemic 
resources calibrated from marginalized positions” (Pohlhaus 2012, 720–721). But 
this does not occur when white vilification complainants co-opt the status of “victim 
of hate speech.”15 
The concept “hate speech”’ (an epistemic resource) has been calibrated to a 
marginalized social location to allow oppressed groups to make sense of certain 
experiences and the harms they endure. Though it was first developed by a group of 
US legal scholars in the 1980s, hate speech has now become an ordinary concept 
(Brown 2017, 424).16 It has also spread to Australia and taken root in its dominant 
social imaginary. However, this concept has not taken root in its appropriately 
calibrated form. When racial minorities employ it, the intention is to highlight a 
form of treatment that is substantially damaging to its targets. Hate speech, 
properly understood, is oppressive speech that constitutes a form of systemic 
group-based violence, where violence is understood to include “severe incidents of 
harassment, intimidation, or ridicule simply for the purpose of degrading, 
humiliating, or stigmatizing group members” (Young 1990, 61; see also Richardson-
Self 2018). However, the ordinary meaning of the concept has been stretched, 
disfigured by the ideal of impartiality and the grounding view of equality as 
sameness. As Brown observes,  
 
More recent usage seems to permit a competent user to describe as “hate 
speech” instances in which members of an oppressed or victimised group 
lashes out verbally against members of an oppressive or victimising 
group. . . . This newer accepted usage may partly reflect a white backlash 
against the original use of the term “hate speech” (to condemn what whites 
had to say about other racial or ethnic groups), but it is also likely to reflect 
the broader work that society as a whole now expects the term “hate 
speech” to do—for example, to identify or flag up forms of speech that 
                                                          
15 Co-opting is different than “suppressing” and “resisting adoption” through the use 
of alternative concepts, which are both discussed by Anderson (2017, 146). 
16 By this, I mean it “is (a) used by people who are not legal professionals or writers 
about the law, and (b) has a panoply of uses . . . within a range of other social, 
cultural, political and economic domains” (Brown 2017, 422). 
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society as whole fears have the potential to be very socially divisive or 
destructive of social cohesion. (2017, 444) 
 
While I think Brown is right to diagnose that the ordinary concept “hate speech” has 
taken on this new meaning, I find that he is too generous in his suggestion that this 
is likely because society now expects the term to do broader work. That this is a 
form of backlash by (some) mainstream Australians (as well as mainstream 
Americans, mainstream Britons, etc.) is something we need to take seriously, but it 
is important to realize that this backlash may be pre-reflective and largely affective, 
given that our social imaginaries function latently (Lennon 2015, 107). Such 
attitudes are more likely elicited because of a commitment to the ideal of 
impartiality and grounding view of equality as sameness, due to the white 
vilification complainant’s inability to recognize that he does not reason from a 
universal perspective, due to the privileged group’s experiences and standards 
being constructed as normal and neutral, due to the vested interest white 
vilification complainants have in not coming to understand themselves as socially 
privileged.17 
When white complainants assert that they have been racially vilified, the 
epistemic resource which can make sense of a particular phenomenon is not taken 
up in the appropriate way.18 It would be possible for white vilification complainants 
to learn to use the epistemic resource “hate speech” appropriately, but the fact that 
they co-opt and disfigure the concept, using it instead to refer to any form of 
negative racialized commentary—including “these people think X because they are 
white”—is to engage in willful hermeneutical ignorance. The complainants distort 
an epistemic resource in order to maintain an inaccurate understanding of the 
experienced world. As a consequence, the following occurs: first, marginally 
situated people cannot demonstrate that there is a part of the experienced world 
for which the disfigured epistemic resource is inadequate, because dominantly 
situated knowers (that is, white vilification complainants, as mainstream 
Australians) do not attend to that part of the world. Second, the marginally situated 
cannot call the attention of white vilification complainants to those parts of the 
experienced world, because the epistemic resource which was available to do so has 
already been co-opted and transformed (Pohlhaus 2012, 728). As Luvell Anderson 
puts it, “There is an obscuring of what the speaker intends to be the import of her 
speech. And . . . there is a loss in the ability of certain speakers to both produce 
                                                          
17 This is the type of ignorance José Medina (2011, 26) refers to as “active.” 
18 Anderson makes a similar argument regarding the misinterpretation of the activist 
phrase “Black Lives Matter” (2017). 
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certain utterances and be interpreted correctly” (2017, 143). That is, both meaning 
and credibility are inhibited. 
In short, white vilification complainants like Gaynor and Zanetti maintain 
their ignorance by actively undermining the “epistemic resource that attends to 
those parts of the world they are invested in ignoring” (Pohlhaus 2012, 728). What 
is more, these white vilification complainants ought to be held to account for this 
epistemic injustice because their failure to take up the proper meaning of the 
concept “hate speech” is not a consequence of an inability to do so.19 As Pohlhaus 
explains, it is by attending to the distinction between interdependence and 
situatedness that we are able to see this. As she puts it, “Situatedness cannot be 
transcended, but with habitual practice epistemic resources can make more evident 
to the knower that which is not immediately obvious from her position in the world” 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 729). If white vilification complainants took “an active interest in 
how the world is revealed from marginalized experiences,” then they could learn to 
use epistemic resources appropriately and avoid committing this epistemic injustice 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 731).  
So, it is here we see that this epistemic injustice is, in fact, grounded in a 
failure of recognition. In order to take an interest in the experiences of the 
marginalized, one must first be willing to recognize the other as other, outside the 
logic of unity that belies the ideal of impartiality and the foundational meaning-
generating narrative of the liberal tradition. For one cannot “forge truly cooperative 
interdependent relations with marginally situated knowers” (Pohlhaus 2012, 733) 
until one comes to see difference, and to see it as alterity.  
 
VI. Comparative Credibility Excess 
White vilification complainants like Gaynor and Zanetti may also receive an 
excess in credibility. This, too, would be an epistemic injustice. In order to see how 
this is the case, we need to keep in mind the contours of Australia’s dominant social 
imaginary. This dominant social imaginary (or dominant epistemic context) is 
something that operates at the hermeneutical and testimonial levels. At the 
hermeneutical level, the social imaginary shapes people’s “capacities for 
                                                          
19 As evidence, consider Senator Chris Evans’s argument in favour of federal 
legislation making racist hate speech a civil offence. As this was being debated, he 
said: “In considering this bill, senators must be mindful that, as predominantly white 
middle-class Anglo-Saxon males, we have a different perspective from that of the 
victims of racist behaviour. How many of us have been subjected to abuse in the 
streets, damage to our home or businesses, or campaigns exhorting our banishment 
or murder simply because of our race, colour or national or ethnic origin?” 
(Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 23 August 1995, 223). 
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interpreting and understanding things (opening their eyes and ears to certain things 
and not others),” while at the testimonial level, the social imaginary shapes people’s 
“capacities for listening properly and for assigning adequate levels of credibility and 
authority” (Medina 2011, 27). We must also understand that no testimonial 
exchange happens in a vacuum. They take place in historically specific 
circumstances.  
As mentioned above, Australia has its own complex history of settler 
colonialism and, despite popular belief, remains a society that is stratified by 
relations of racial domination and oppression today. Accepting (trusting) this as fact 
is crucial to illustrating how white vilification complaints like Gaynor’s and Zanetti’s 
can cause harm. As Medina notes, “perceptions of credibility and authority are 
forms of social recognition that are bound to be affected by the cultural habits of 
recognition available for differently positioned subjects with respect to different 
social groups” (Medina 2011, 21–22). Thus, if the dominant perception is that racial 
neutrality has been (very nearly) achieved in Australia, when, in fact, white 
Australians retain the social and epistemic advantages produced by Australia’s 
colonial past, then one will likely attribute credibility in line with this implicit racial 
hierarchy.20 In short, the historical tendency to attribute credibility to the testimony 
of white men may further incline third parties to continue attributing such 
credibility, since this is the type of testimony that has been rendered “impartial.” 
This need not be a conscious judgment, but may itself be caused by an implicit 
prejudice—not a prejudice as strong or self-evident as disbelieving all people of 
colour because they are people of colour, but perhaps simply an unconscious 
prejudice “against taking seriously the experienced world outside of white men” 
(Pohlhaus 2012, 725; emphasis added). Thus, we see why it is likely that testimony 
such as Gaynor’s and Zanetti’s may receive a credibility excess.  
To see why credibility excess is a form of testimonial injustice, we need to 
focus on the nature of credibility-attribution itself, and we must recognize that “the 
epistemic injustices we are examining have a systematic character: they are 
produced by—and are at the same time productive within—a complex system of 
social relations and practices in which unfair disparities among groups are 
maintained” (Medina 2011, 24). While credibility may not be distributive, it certainly 
seems to be the case that, much of the time, we do credit others less if we credit 
                                                          
20 Elsewhere I make a comparative point with regard to seeking queer rights in a 
heteropatriarchal social context. If one seeks neutrality in a biased context, then any 
social benefit will always be first and foremost tailored to the benchmark man 
(Richardson-Self 2015, 66–68). 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, Article 4 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  18 
someone else more. What explains this, Medina thinks, is that credibility has a 
comparative and contrastive quality.21 As he explains,  
 
Implicitly, being judged credible to some degree is being regarded as more 
credible than others, less credible than others, and equally credible as 
others. Credibility never applies to subjects individually and in isolation from 
others, but always affects clusters of subjects in particular social networks 
and environments. (Medina 2011, 18) 
 
In short, it is not that credibility is finite, but that we apply it in a comparative and 
contrastive, contextualized way.  
Medina holds that a credibility excess can be an epistemic injustice precisely 
because—history and context permitting—another group receives a credibility 
deficit by default, and over time this leads to unjust hierarchies of credibility, and 
hence contributes to unjust relations of social identity-power in the epistemic 
context (2011, 20). As he puts it, “Credibility judgments have effects (both proximal 
and distal) not only on their recipients, but on others involved in the interaction as 
well as others indirectly related to it (predecessors and successors of the exchange)” 
(Medina 2011, 18). Gaynor and Zanetti’s complaints originally involved only 
themselves, Burney, and representatives of the AHRC, as participants in the 
exchange. But they emerged from a racially charged environment, and in choosing 
to make their complaints (and their reasoning for their complaints) public via their 
blogs, they also engaged in a form of open-ended testimony. Those who encounter 
the testimony may well, in line with the historical tendency, accord them an excess 
of credibility due to the dominant impression that the experienced world of white 
men is actually neutral, universal, rational, and impartial. 
The white vilification complainants could not offer their testimony in good 
faith if they had not first failed to recognize the alterity of others. Speaking from 
what they take to be the rational, impartial, universal(izable) perspective, they 
remain steadfastly closed-minded, dogmatic, and impervious to criticism. And these 
complaints can elicit credibility due to already established norms and (implicit and 
                                                          
21 Importantly, Miranda Fricker originally argued that credibility excesses cannot 
constitute testimonial injustices (2007, 21), though she later changed her position, 
distinguishing between “distributive epistemic injustice” and “discriminatory 
epistemic injustice” (see Fricker 2013). David Coady argued further that we can gain 
fruitful insights when we recognize both as forms of distributive injustice (2017, 61). 
I prefer Medina’s comparative and contrastive account, since it gets at the 
intersubjective nature of credibility attribution without having to treat credibility as 
finite. 
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explicit) biases regarding the reliability of testimony from “people like this.” This is 
true, even though their “being like this” (that is, white) is rendered invisible thanks 
to the cultural imperialism of the group in its very disavowal of difference. 
Moreover, an excess of testimonial credibility almost always brings about a 
comparative credibility deficit to the speech of others. This renders mainstream 
Australians more likely to believe that figures like Linda Burney are just as bad as 
garden variety racists, which is what Gaynor and Zanetti suggest. It also renders 
mainstream Australians less inclined to believe in the severity of racial vilification 
complaints made by people of colour because, by parity of reasoning, they seem 
just as trivial as instances of white vilification. Insofar as this occurs, Australians of 
colour are wronged in their capacities as knowers. 
In short, any credibility excess resulting from these white vilification 
complaints will be an epistemic injustice because it perpetuates both the 
overestimation of the knowledge borne by white Australians and the 
underestimation of the knowledge borne by Australians of colour. Yet, with the 
proper recognition of racialized identity status in the contemporary Australian 
context—that is, by acknowledging alterity and abandoning the (unattainable) ideal 
of impartiality—one will not grant credibility excesses to white vilification 
complainants, because one will have a more “nuanced understanding of the 
particularities of the social context, and the needs particular people have and 
experience within it” (Young 1990, 96). Thus, again, we see that it is a failure of 
recognition that can cause this epistemic injustice.  
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
As Young points out in the quote which prefaces this article, there is nothing 
but what is, the situated interest in justice, from which to start our normative 
reflections on that very topic (1990, 5). In order to understand relations of 
domination and oppression in contemporary Australia, and to attempt to change 
them, one must begin from a specific call to justice—even if that call is misguided 
and perpetuates the existing relations of domination and oppression. I also choose 
to focus on white vilification complaints in particular because, as indicated by 
Stoetzler and Yuval-Davis, it is crucial to understand the hegemonic centre, including 
the ways people situated there think and act, since most political decisions affecting 
the largest number of people come from this position (2002, 319). Like them, I 
believe that in order to bring about a society that is not stratified by relations of 
domination and oppression, it is important to first understand what the dominant 
cultural group believes (as reflected in the dominant social imaginary). Once one 
understands this, one can then challenge this normative position and generate 
epistemic friction by calling upon resistant imaginaries that present alternatives for 
a different future (Medina 2011, 28). 
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Understanding the logic behind the white vilification complaints analysed 
here has required making aspects of Australia’s dominant social imaginary visible. 
Having done so, we can now see how the meaning-generating narrative of liberal 
equality and the ideal of impartiality constrains irreducible human difference to a 
singular, unitary logic. This is, in itself, oppressive to marginally situated others, 
since it allows the privileged group to maintain its cultural imperialism under the 
guise of neutrality and universality. But the failure to (re-)cognize difference also 
underscores this comparative credibility excess. As argued above, credibility 
judgments are affected by the hermeneutical and testimonial levels. And, as Medina 
points out, the latter depends on the former, since “hearers cannot listen to a 
speaker fairly if there is a hermeneutical gap that prevents them from 
understanding and interpreting that speaker” (Medina 2011, 27). As we have 
already seen, there is a hermeneutical gap, which is maintained by willful 
hermeneutical ignorance. 
Given the contours of the dominant social imaginary (which enables willful 
hermeneutical ignorance), it is difficult—but not impossible—for mainstream 
Australians to engage with the appropriately calibrated hermeneutical resources 
developed by the marginalized for making sense of their oppression. In the case of 
the white vilification complaints analysed, the complainants could have learned to 
apply the concept “hate speech” appropriately and gained more accurate 
knowledge about how the world is. Instead they co-opted and disfigured this 
concept, applying it to their own experiences of racialized speech in a way that 
allows them to genuinely maintain the ideal of impartiality, and to protest that 
political correctness has now gone too far—that white people are now the 
underdogs, the new victims, those who have fallen afoul of a double standard, now 
subjected to reverse racism. Because such complaints come from the culturally 
dominant social group, white vilification complainants are also likely to have their 
understanding of the concept “hate speech” gain credibility and be taken up as the 
correct understanding. This further entrenches the cultural dominance of white 
Australians, and makes it all the more difficult for the marginalized to show that the 
types of racial vilification they encounter is both qualitatively particular and also 
oppressive. Their knowledge cannot be shared; thus, they are wronged as knowers. 
Attempting to generate changes in a dominant social imaginary is no small 
feat. Imaginaries often operate at a pre-reflective level, but when epistemic friction 
emerges, what is latent can be made visible, analysable, and hence changeable 
(Lennon 2015, 107). I have suggested that a resistant imaginary which proposes a 
politics of difference enables people to recognize the alterity of the other rather 
than reduce the other’s specificity to a singular logic of sameness. I have also 
suggested that, where alterity is recognized, epistemic injustices such as those 
produced in the testimony of Gaynor and Zanetti would not occur (without malice). 
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However, the Australian dominant social imaginary will only change alongside shifts 
in social power relations (Lennon 2015, 112). As such, members of the culturally 
dominant group must commit to engaging with resistant imaginings with a critical 
openness to the other and their testimony, and they must develop their capacities 
as listeners and a propensity to epistemically esteem the other in recognition of 
their alterity, if we are to prevent such injustices in the future (Bubeck 2000, 198; 
Congdon 2017, 249). 
 
 
References 
AHRC (Australian Human Rights Commission). 2015. Know Your Rights: Aboriginal 
Torres Strait Islanders. Australian Human Rights Commission. 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/aboriginal-and-torres-strait-
islander-social-justice/publications/know-your-rights. 
———. 2016. Race Hate and the RDA. Australian Human Rights Commission. 
https://www.humanrights.gov.au/our-work/race-
discrimination/projects/race-hate-and-rda.  
Anderson, Luvell. 2017. “Epistemic Injustice and the Philosophy of Race.” In The 
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by James Kidd, José 
Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., 139–148. London: Routledge. 
Bourke, Latika. 2018. “Coalition Backs Pauline Hanson’s “It’s OK to be White” 
Motion.” Sydney Morning Herald, October 15. 
https://www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/coalition-backs-pauline-hanson-s-
it-s-ok-to-be-white-motion-20181015-p509tw.html. 
Brown, Alexander. 2017. “What Is Hate Speech? Part 1: The Myth of Hate.” Law and 
Philosophy 36 (4): 419–468. 
Bubeck, Diemut. 2000. “Feminism in Political Philosophy: Women’s Difference.” In 
The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, edited by Miranda 
Fricker and Jennifer Hornsby, 185–204. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Coady, David. 2017. “Epistemic Injustice as Distributive Injustice.” In The Routledge 
Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by James Kidd, José Medina, and 
Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., 61–68. London: Routledge. 
Edmonds, Penelope, and Jane Carey. 2016. “Australian Settler Colonialism over the 
Long Nineteenth Century: New Insights into History, Gender and Biopolitics.” 
In The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism, edited by 
Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini, 371–389. New York: Routledge. 
Fraser, Nancy. 2000. “Rethinking Recognition.” New Left Review 3:107–120. 
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, Article 4 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  22 
———. 2013. “Epistemic Injustice as a Condition of Political Freedom?” Synthese 190 
(7): 1317–1332. 
Gaynor, Bernard. 2016. “18C Complaint Against Labor MP Linda Burney.” 
BernardGaynor.com.au, November 10. http://bernardgaynor.com.au/18c-
complaint-labor-mp-linda-burney/. 
———. 2017. “Time’s Running Out For 18C.” BernardGaynor.com.au, January 31. 
http://bernardgaynor.com.au/times-running-18c/. 
Gelber, Katharine. 2014. “Commentary on McLeod v Power.” In Australian Feminist 
Judgments: Righting and Rewriting Law, edited by Heather Douglas, 
Francesca Bartlett, Trish Luker, and Rosemary Hunter, 405–408. Oxford: Hart 
Publishing. 
Haggis, Jane, and Susanne Schech. 2009. “Migrant, Masculinities and Work in the 
Australian National Imaginary.” In Migrant Men: Critical Studies of 
Masculinities and the Migration Experience, edited by Mike Donaldson, 
Raymond Hibbins, Richard Howsen, and Bob Pease, 60–76. New York: 
Routledge. 
Henderson, Anna, and Uma Patel. 2016. “David Leyonhjelm Makes Human Rights 
Complaint over ‘Angry White Male’ Claim to Test 18C.” ABC News, August 
15. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-08-15/leyonhjelm-makes-human-
rights-complaint-over-18c-white-male/7733950. 
Hutchens, Gareth, and Paul Karp. 2016. “Eric Abetz Says the Phrase ‘Angry White 
Man’ Is Racial Vilification.” Guardian, August 15. 
https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2016/aug/15/eric-abetz-says-
the-phrase-angry-white-man-is-racial-vilification. 
Irigaray, Luce. 2000. Democracy Begins Between Two. Translated by Kirsteen 
Anderson. New York: Routledge. 
Koziol, Michael. 2016. “Human Rights Commission Rejects David Leyonhjelm ‘Angry 
White Male’ Discrimination Claim.” Sydney Morning Herald, November 30. 
http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/human-rights-
commission-rejects-david-leyonhjelm-angry-white-male-discrimination-
claim-20161129-gt0el9.html. 
Lennon, Kathleen. 2015. Imagination and the Imaginary. London: Routledge. 
Lloyd, Genevieve. 1984. The Man of Reason: “Male” and “Female” in Western 
Philosophy. Suffolk: Methuen.  
Markell, Patchen. 2006. “Recognition and Redistribution.” In The Oxford Handbook 
of Political Theory, edited by John S. Dryzek, Bonnie Honig, and Anne Phillips, 
450–469. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mason, Gail. 2009. “Hate Crime Laws in Australia: Are They Achieving Their Goals?” 
Criminal Law Journal 33:326–340. 
Richardson-Self – Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  23 
Medina, José. 2011. “The Relevance of Credibility Excess in a Proportional View of 
Epistemic Injustice: Differential Epistemic Authority and the Social 
Imaginary.” Social Epistemology 25 (1): 15–35. 
Mills, Charles W. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Moran, Anthony. 2009. “What Settler Australians Talk About When They Talk About 
Aborigines: Reflections on an In-Depth Interview Study.” Ethnic and Racial 
Studies 32 (5): 781–801. 
Morgan, Myles, and James Elton-Pym. 2018. “Coalition Senators Backed Hanson’s 
“Okay to be White” Motion by Mistake.” SBS, October 17. 
https://www.sbs.com.au/yourlanguage/mandarin/en/article/2018/10/16/co
alition-senators-backed-hansons-okay-be-white-motion-mistake. 
Okin, Susan Moller. 1979. Women in Western Political Thought. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press.  
———. 1989. Justice, Gender, and the Family. New York: Basic Books. 
Pateman, Carole. 1988. The Sexual Contract. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Pohlhaus, Gaile, Jr. 2012. “Relational Knowing and Epistemic Injustice: Toward a 
Theory of Willful Hermeneutical Ignorance.” Hypatia 27 (4): 715–734. 
———. 2017. “Varieties of Epistemic Injustice.” In The Routledge Handbook of 
Epistemic Injustice, edited by James Kidd, José Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, 
Jr., 13–26. London: Routledge.  
Richardson-Self, Louise. 2015. Justifying Same-Sex Marriage: A Philosophical 
Investigation. London: Rowman & Littlefield International. 
———. 2018. “Woman-Hating: On Misogyny, Sexism, and Hate Speech.” Hypatia 
33:256–272. 
Shanahan, Dennis. 2017. “Blowout in Racial Hatred Cases.” The Australian, February 
28. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/blowout-in-racial-
hatred-cases/news-story/3a05c15c391de91fc4a481fcc1a100fc. 
Stoetzler, Marcel, and Nira Yuval-Davis. 2002. “Standpoint Theory, Situated 
Knowledge and the Situated Imagination.” Feminist Theory 3 (3): 315–332. 
Taylor, Charles. 2004. Modern Social Imaginaries. Durham, NC: Public Planet Books. 
Thomsen, Simon. 2016. “Some Australians Are Furious with a New Lamb Ad for 
Diversity, Saying It's ‘Racist’ and Offensive to White People.” Business 
Insider, October 25. https://www.businessinsider.com.au/some-australians-
are-furious-with-a-new-lamb-ad-for-diversity-saying-its-racist-and-offensive-
to-white-people-2016-10. 
Tuana, Nancy. 2017. “Feminist Epistemology: The Subject of Knowledge.” In The 
Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice, edited by James Kidd, José 
Medina, and Gaile Pohlhaus, Jr., 125–138. London: Routledge. 
Feminist Philosophy Quarterly, 2018, Vol. 4, Iss. 4, Article 4 
 
Published by Scholarship@Western, 2018  24 
Wood, Patrick. 2017. “Australia Becoming ‘A More Racist Country,’ Survey Finds.” 
ABC News Breakfast, February 9. http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-02-
09/australia-is-becoming-a-more-racist-country-survey/8254592. 
Young, Iris Marion. 1990. Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
Zanetti, Paul. 2016a. “An Open Letter to the Hon Linda Burney MP Regarding Her 
Racist, Sexist, Ageist Comment.” Zanetti’sView.com, November 13. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170702102152/http://zanettisview.com:80/
story/an-open-letter-to-the-hon-linda-burney-mp-regarding-her-racist-
sexist-ageist-comment/3751. 
———. 2016b. “Australian Human Rights Commission's Discrimination—and My 
Reply.” Zanetti’sView.com, November 26. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170913203812/http://zanettisview.com/sto
ry/australian-human-rights-commissions-discrimination-and-my-reply/3799. 
———. 2016c. “My Submission to the Govt's Section 18C and Freedom of Speech 
Inquiry.” Zanetti’sView.com, December 8. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170913204809/http://zanettisview.com/sto
ry/my-submission-to-the-govts-section-18c-and-freedom-of-speech-
inquiry/3854. 
———. 2017. “I’ve Been Trigged! Sexism, Racism, Ageism from the Aust Human 
Rights Commission.” Zanetti’sView.com, June 24. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170727011704/http://www.zanettisview.co
m:80/story/ive-been-trigged-sexism-racism-ageism-from-the-aust-human-
rights-commission/4522. 
 
 
LOUISE RICHARDSON-SELF is a lecturer in philosophy and gender studies at the 
University of Tasmania. Her recent publications include “Woman-Hating: On 
Misogyny, Sexism, and Hate Speech” (Hypatia, 2018) and “Same-Sex Marriage and 
the ‘No’ Campaign” (Humanities Australia, forthcoming). She is also the author of 
Justifying Same-Sex Marriage: A Philosophical Investigation (Rowman & Littlefield 
International, 2015). Her research interests include hate speech, human rights, 
social imaginaries, oppression, and French feminisms. 
